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Abstract 
 
We demonstrate that unproductive costs facilitate group formation and mitigate free 
riding. We conduct an experiment that allows groups to form endogenously by having 
subjects reveal their willingness to “sacrifice” a fraction of their private productivity 
within a voluntary contribution mechanism public goods game. The sacrifice mechanism, 
previously identified in the theory of religious clubs, functions in the lab absent any 
group identity or shared doctrine. We find that groups which emerge from subject 
preferences for higher rates of sacrifice screen out free riders, attract conditional 
cooperators, increase contributions to the public good, and offer potential welfare gains 
for members. 
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1. Introduction 
Many individuals belong to groups that foster cooperation amongst members – social 
clubs, religious organizations, gangs, fraternities, social movement organizations, and the 
like. In such groups, each member contributes to a club good with positive externalities 
bestowed on the other group members. Group members have incentive to free ride, since 
it is difficult to exclude them from reaping the benefits of the group’s actions. Some 
groups overcome the free-rider problem through monitoring, repeated interaction, or 
sanctions and rewards. Such mechanisms, however, are difficult to employ when inputs 
are not perfectly observable or groups are large enough that the threat of cutting off 
repeated interaction is limited (Olson 1971). Cooperation can be difficult to maintain 
even in small group settings, especially where enforcement institutions are lacking 
(Ostrom 1990). Nonetheless, groups facing these obstacles manage to successfully foster 
cooperation amongst their members every day. For example, contributions (or lack 
thereof) made to communes or religious services by any single member are often 
unobservable and hence difficult to sanction, reward, or track through time – yet such 
groups are ubiquitous. Why is this, and how do they form in the first place?   
Iannaccone (1992) was the first to suggest that unproductive costs could increase 
the production of club goods and the net welfare of members. He proposed that “sacrifice 
and stigma” – unproductive costs – are mechanisms that religious groups employ to 
mitigate free riding by rational members. Religious groups face particularly vexing free 
rider problems, as exclusion is antithetical to proselytization goals and contributions are 
often difficult to monitor. The use of unproductive costs mitigates free-riding in two 
dimensions. First, it screens out individuals who are likely to free ride. Second, it changes 
the relative prices of group and non-group goods for members, hence increasing their 
level of contribution to the group good. The sacrifice and stigma theory thus provides a 
rational-choice explanation for the seemingly irrational behavior of voluntarily incurring 
unproductive costs. In the economics of religion literature alone, these insights have been 
employed to explain the behavior of radical religious groups (Berman 2004, 2009; 
Berman and Laitin 2005; Iannaccone 2006; Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Makowsky 
2010), “strict” churches (Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Iannaccone 1997), Ultra-Orthodox 
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Jews (Berman 2000), Israeli kibbutzim (Abramitzky 2008), and 19th century utopian 
communes (Sosis 2000). 
Yet, in each of these cases, numerous phenomena could be at work. For example, 
it is possible that individuals join groups with sacrifice or stigma requirements simply 
because they have idiosyncratic preferences for sacrifice or stigma (or the group identity 
associated with these actions). Such an alternative explanation cannot be disproven 
empirically without detailed information regarding individuals’ motivations. If 
idiosyncratic preferences are indeed the primary factors driving such behaviors, then 
groups are not endogenously forming to screen out free-riders, but instead are separating 
based on desire for sacrificing or stigmatizing. This is an important difference, as a key 
insight of the sacrifice and stigma theory is that unproductive costs can be employed for 
economically productive purposes.  
We propose the use of a laboratory experiment, absent any group identity or 
doctrinal construct, to separate the rational choice explanation proposed by Iannaccone 
from a preference-driven approach. We test whether imposing unproductive costs is an 
effective mechanism for endogenously forming groups which screen out free-riders. To 
this end, we employ a variant of the standard public goods game, the voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM), where subjects are granted an endowment and asked to 
split the endowment between themselves and the group. The VCM game is ideal for 
testing the theoretical problems associated with club goods, as the same problems arise in 
each: the Nash equilibrium prediction is that everyone free rides (gives nothing to the 
group), while the socially optimal solution is for everyone to give everything to the 
group. Our variant of the VCM game allows subjects to endogenously form groups by 
choosing a level of sacrifice (the unproductive cost) that is imposed on their private (non-
group) good and the private good of each of their group members. From this, we gather 
what “types” of individuals enter high-sacrifice groups and how they act with respect to 
group contributions once in these groups. 
Our experiment offers a chance to test the impact of unproductive costs on group 
sorting, group productivity, and member welfare. It also allows us to delineate between 
screening and relative price effects. We observe that sacrifice acts as a screening 
mechanism whereby subjects more prone to cooperation separate themselves from free 
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riders. That is, subjects who are willing to give more to the group screen out free riders 
endogenously via unproductive costs. Moreover, differences in relative prices (of the 
public and private goods) between high-sacrifice and low-sacrifice groups encourage 
greater contributions to the public good in high-sacrifice groups and hence greater overall 
earnings. 
Cooperation norms observed in laboratory experiments have long been 
recognized as generating levels of cooperation that exceed equilibrium theory (Davis and 
Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995). Yet, while whole families of social norms and market 
constructs have been offered as potential mechanisms for staving off reversion to free 
riding behavior, few are concerned with how these mechanisms arise endogenously. For 
example, Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2000) found that exogenous sorting, where free-riders 
less frequently interacted with defectors, was highly effective at slowing the decay rate of 
contributions. Likewise, Swope (2004) found that excludability of the public good 
through exogenously set minimum rates of contribution in the standard VCM setup was 
effective in curtailing free-riding but unable to consistently improve overall welfare. 
Other mechanisms tested in the laboratory include punishing defectors with sanctions 
(Masclet et al. 2003; Houser et al. 2008; Noussair and Tucker 2005; Anderson and 
Putterman 2006) and rewarding cooperators with greater rewards (Bohnet and Kubler 
2005).1  
Endogenous group formation (and partner selection in two player games) is a 
recent addition to the story of free rider mitigation (Coricelli et al. 2004; Page et al. 
2005). Bohnet and Kubler (2005) achieve quasi-self sorting by auctioning off the right to 
play a more attractive form of a prisoners’ dilemma, which offers insurance against 
defection. They find that cooperation increases temporarily but decreases over time. Ahn 
et al. (2008) find that restricted entry through admissions voting by current members who 
can observe past contribution rates of applicants can effectively increase contribution 
rates. Our results add to this literature by inducing endogenous group formation – through 
                                                 
1 Sanctions and rewards have both been found effective in increasing contributions, but with strong caveats 
regarding magnitudes, perceptions of intent, and signal erosion over repeated play.  Social institutions 
maintain the VCM game narrowly defined, but augment it via information, interaction, or group formation. 
Examples of  social institutions tested in the laboratory, beyond VCM games, include communication 
before game play (Isaac and Walker 1988) and after game play (Xiao and Houser 2005), voting, exogenous 
sorting/matching of players (Burlando and Guala 2005), and the option of not playing (Orbell and Dawes 
1993). For reviews of the relevant literature, see Laffont (1987) and Ledyard (1995). 
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a mechanism found ubiquitously in the real world – with a simple modification to a 
standard public goods game. 
  Results from our experiment strongly support the hypothesis that unproductive 
costs can successfully engender higher rates of cooperation amongst group members and 
do so in an anonymous laboratory setting absent any group identity or doctrine. We find 
that changes in relative prices (between private and public goods) act to screen out free-
riders and that subjects who choose high-sacrifice groups contribute more to the public 
good once in these groups. Our results suggest that members of high sacrifice groups 
experience positive expected welfare gains, but with greater risk of net losses relative to 
low sacrifice groups.  
 
2. Experiment 
2.1.Normal VCM Game 
Our experiment employs a variant of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism 
(VCM) public goods experiment (Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995). In the “Normal” 
VCM game, each subject is randomly placed into a group with three other subjects.  Each 
subject independently makes a decision on how to divide a personal endowment of ten 
tokens between two accounts: a “private account” and a “group account.”  A subject gets 
one Experimental Dollar (E$) for each token they place in their own private account, and 
each of the four subjects in a group receives a return, of r E$s, for each token placed into 
the group account by any group member. A subject i’s earnings in the experiment are 
therefore:   
(1) ∏(gi,g-i) = (10 – gi) + r · (gi + ∑g-i)     
where gi is the amount that i gives to the group. Each subject receives 0.40 E$s for every 
token any of their group members (including themselves) place into the group account, or 
r = 0.40.  
The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is that all players free-ride and contribute 
nothing to the group (each token returns 1.00 E$s from being placed into a private 
account).  However, the socially optimal solution is for all players to contribute 
everything to the group account (each token returns 0.40 E$s to each of the four subjects 
in the group, for a total return of 1.60E$s for each token placed into a group account). In 
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actual experimental settings, players routinely contribute resources greater than zero, 
although repeated play of the game routinely reveals a steady decay of contributions 
(Davis and Holt 1993).    
 
2.2.Sacrifice VCM Game 
We introduce a “Sacrifice” VCM game, in order to capture subjects preferences predicted 
in the Iannaccone (1992) sacrifice and stigma model. The group account return in the 
Sacrifice VCM game is the same as in the Normal VCM game (r = 0.40). The difference 
between the Sacrifice and Normal VCM games is that the former allows subjects to 
indicate their preference for groups based on the private account return that all group 
members receive. While the return to the private account in the Normal VCM game is 
fixed at 1.00 E$ per token, subjects in the Sacrifice VCM choose a level of sacrifice, si, 
by choosing a private account return (1 – si) in the range {0.55, 0.60, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 
0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95} E$s per token (restricting the implied sacrifice preference of each 
subject, si, to the range [0.05, 0.45]). The private account return choices of the subjects 
are then ordered from highest to lowest.  The four subjects with the highest private 
account return choices (lowest sacrifice preferences) are placed in a group together, the 
four subjects with the next highest private account return choices are placed in a group 
together, and so on (with all ties broken randomly).  
The private account return in each group is then set to (1 – s*) E$s for every token 
a subject places in their private account, where s* is the average sacrifice level (si) chosen 
by the members of a particular group. Equation 2 shows how sacrifice affects subject 
earnings. 
(2) ∏(gi,g-i) = [(10 – gi) · (1 – s*)] + r · (gi + ∑g-i) 
Since 1 – si is restricted to the range [0.55, 0.95], the private account return (1 – s*) is 
guaranteed to be greater than the group account return (since r = 0.4).  Hence, the Nash 
equilibrium in the Sacrifice VCM is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium in the Normal 
VCM game: each player contributes nothing to the group account and everything to the 
private account. It follows that that choosing the minimum possible sacrifice, 1 – si = 
0.95, is a Nash equilibrium action.  
2.3.Implementation of the VCM games 
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We implement each of the VCM games using the Fischbacher et al. (2001) type 
elicitation method.  As in Fischbacher et al.’s public goods experiment, individuals make 
both a conditional contribution decision (conditional on the average choice of the group 
members) and an unconditional contribution decision. For their conditional contribution 
decision, subjects indicate how many tokens they would like to contribute to the group 
account conditional on each possible average contribution of the other three group 
members (from 0 to 10 tokens). The conditional contribution of one randomly selected 
subject in each group is used in the experiment, and the remaining subjects use their 
unconditional contribution. 
Each subject participates in multiple one-shot VCM games, though subjects are 
not told how many games they play. We use two different treatment orderings of the 
Normal and Sacrifice VCM games. In the first treatment, henceforth referred to as the 
“Experienced” ordering, subjects complete a Normal VCM first and a Sacrifice VCM 
second (named because subjects have experienced a completed VCM game before 
making their sacrifice decisions). In the second treatment, henceforth referred to as the 
“Inexperienced” ordering, subjects complete a Sacrifice VCM first and a Normal VCM 
second.2 After playing the two VCM game rounds, subjects in both treatments play a 
second Sacrifice VCM game (see the instructions in Appendix A). 
 
3. Theory and Predictions 
3.1.Setup 
Iannaccone (1992) suggests that sacrifice encourages optimal participation in a club good 
by increasing the implicit (or shadow) price of the non-club good. 3 It may also serve as a 
mechanism whereby those with lower opportunity costs of contributing to the group good 
screen out free riders by imposing higher costs on the private good. In this section, we 
develop a model that extends these hypotheses in the context of the experiment. 
                                                 
2 In the Experienced ordering, subjects read the additional instructions associated with the Sacrifice VCM 
after completing the Normal VCM round.  In the Inexperienced ordering subjects read the additional 
instructions associated with the Sacrifice VCM immediately following the basic game instructions.  We do 
this so that subjects would approach the first VCM game as a one-shot game without the anticipation of the 
second round game. 
3 In this case, we are discussing a positive congestion club good, where greater participation by an 
individual is always a net positive for the other members of the club. 
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The population consists of N players who choose groups to join. These groups 
contain the features of classic club goods. Each player derives utility from the 
contributions of other players in their club, with utility increasing in total contributions – 
similar to the VCM game described in section 2. 
We begin by assuming that subjects differ along one dimension – the utility they 
derive from giving, in this case to other club members. There are two types of players: 
those who receive utility from giving and those who do not.4 This utility may arise from 
“warm glow”, altruism, expected reciprocity, and the like (Andreoni 1990). As in the 
experiment, the model is not intended to distinguish between altruism, “warm glow”, 
reciprocity, and the like. It merely fleshes out the implications of sacrifice given that any 
or all of these phenomena enter the utility function. 
Before the game begins, each player i receives a realization of their “type”, H or 
L. H-type players derive utility from giving to the group and L-type players do not. H-
type players receive u(gi, ҧ݃) for every gi dollars they give to the group (on top of their 
monetary return), where ҧ݃ is the amount given to the group by the other group members. 
We assume that u(0,·) = 0, u1 > 0, u11 < 0, and u12 ≥ 0. u12 ≥ 0 means that players receive 
(weakly) more utility from giving when others in their group give more. L-type players 
receive zero additional utility from giving to the group (that is, u = 0). 
At the beginning of the game, players receive an endowment which they split 
between their personal consumption and group contribution (as in the classic VCM game 
or in any club setting). As in the experiment, groups differ on the basis of the level of 
(unproductive) sacrifice to private productive activities that are made as a cost of joining 
the group. In the real world, this can be thought of as religious groups with varying 
sacrifice requirements or fraternities with differing levels of hazing. Player i announces 
that she would like to join a group siאS, where si is the sacrifice level i would like the 
group to impose. S = {s0,s1,…,sM}, and it maps onto the sacrifice level of the group with 
whom the player actually plays the game. 
Players are grouped (in groups of size G) with other players who choose similar 
values of si. Grouping works as follows: players are ordered from lowest to highest 
                                                 
4 We have verbally sketched out a version of this model where the utility derived from giving is a 
continuous random variable and there is a continuum of types. That model provides similar, though less 
tractable, insights and is available upon request. 
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choice, and the first G are grouped together, then the next G, and so on (as in the 
experiment). Denote s* as the group that player i joins, which is a function of the sacrifice 
she selects (si).  
Players divide their endowed wealth (normalized to 1) into their private account, 
which yields a constant return, and a group account, which yields a return based on the 
sum of the contributions of all group members. The amount that subject i puts into the 
group account is denoted gi, and she thus puts 1 – gi into its private account. Players 
choose gi in order to maximize their expected equilibrium utility, U: 
(3) U = v((1 – gi)(1 – s*) + r(gi + (G – 1) ҧ݃)) + u(gi, ҧ݃).     
r represents the return from group contributions and v is a standard von Neumann-
Morganstern utility function. Assume that r < 1 – s*, r > 1/G, v’ > 0, and v’’ < 0. The 
assumption r < 1 – s* ensures that the money-maximizing Nash equilibrium is always to 
free ride and give zero to the group, while r > 1/G ensures that giving the entire 
endowment to the group is Pareto optimal. 
The equilibrium amount given to the group is 0 for L-types and is equal to 
max{0,gi*} for H-types, where gi* is defined implicitly by the equation: u1 = (1 – s* – 
r)v’.  
Players then choose a sacrifice level which maximizes their expected payout. 
Again, denote the chosen sacrifice level as si, which in turn helps determine the sacrifice 
level played, s*. Expected utility, given si, is: 
(4) E[U|si] = E[v((1 – gi) (1 – s*) + r(gi + (G – 1) ҧ݃))|si] + E[u(gi, ҧ݃)|si].  
There are two fundamental sources of uncertainty for each player. The first is that 
she does not know how much the other players will give to the group. The amount given 
is a function of the other subjects’ types, which are unobservable. Secondly, the subject 
does not know the mapping of si (the sacrifice level chosen) onto s* (the sacrifice level 
played), since this depends on the choices of the other subjects. Thus, gi* is a random 
variable (from the perspective of player i) because it is a function of s*, while ҧ݃כ is a 
random variable because it is a function of both s* and the types of the players in the 
group.  
3.2.Solving the Model 
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Three broad classes of equilibria exist. In this section, we show the conditions under 
which each type of equilibrium exists. We then derive predictions associated with each 
type of equilibria which are tested in the experiment. 
3.2.1. Pooling Equilibrium 
A pooling equilibrium occurs when all subjects pool into one group, denoted ݏ௉כ . In this 
group, H-type players receive the following expected utility: 
(5)  E[U] = Pr(no L in group)·[v((1 – g*(ݏ௉כ ))(1 – ݏ௉כ ) + rGg*(ݏ௉כ )) + 
u(g*(ݏ௉כ ),(G-1)g*(ݏ௉כ ))] + Pr(one L in group)·[v((1 – g*(ݏ௉כ ))(1 – ݏ௉כ ) + r(G 
– 1)g*(ݏ௉כ )) + u(g*(ݏ௉כ ),(G – 2)g*(ݏ௉כ ))] + Pr(two L in group)·[v((1 – 
g*(ݏ௉כ ))(1 – ݏ௉כ ) + r(G – 2)g*(ݏ௉כ )) + u(g*(ݏ௉כ ),(G – 3)g*(ݏ௉כ ))] + …+ Pr(all 
others L)·[v((1 – g*(ݏ௉כ ))(1 – ݏ௉כ ) + rg*(ݏ௉כ )) + u(g*(ݏ௉כ ),0)] 
Meanwhile, L-type players receive the following expected utility: 
(6)   E[U] = Pr(one L in group)·v(1 – ݏ௉כ  + r(G – 1)g*(ݏ௉כ )) + Pr(two L in 
group)·v(1 – ݏ௉כ  + r(G – 2)g*(ݏ௉כ )) + … + Pr(all L in group)·v(1 – ݏ௉כ ) 
The conditions under which this equilibrium holds are seen by considering the decision 
made by L-type players.5 If an L-type player deviates and chooses some group ݏ஽, she 
will end up in a group with sacrifice level ݏ஽כ ൌ ௦ು
כ ሺீିଵሻା௦ವ
ீ , and she will be placed with a 
random draw of G – 1 players. Thus, her expected utility from deviating is:  
(7)  E[U] = Pr(one L in group)·v(1 – ݏ஽כ  + r(G – 1)g*(ݏ஽כ )) + Pr(two L in 
group)·v(1 – ݏ஽כ  + r(G – 2)g*(ݏ஽כ )) + … + Pr(all L in group)·v(1 – ݏ஽כ ) 
Since the probabilities are the same in both cases, it follows from (6) and (7) that a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an L-type player to deviate is:6 
(8)  ݏ஽כ  – ݏ௉כ  > r(G – 1)[g*(ݏ஽כ ) – g*(ݏ௉כ )]  
Equations (6), (7), and (8) indicate that when price effects ( డ௚
כ
డ௦כ) are large, a 
pooling equilibrium can only exist when there are a sufficiently large number of H-type 
players and ݏ஽  < ݏ௉כ . This is true for all possible deviations (ݏ஽), so the only pooling 
equilibrium that can emerge is in the highest sacrifice group – where a large number of 
H-type players who give a lot to the group provide incentive to stay in the group despite 
                                                 
5 The decisions made by H-type players follow a similar logic and provide the same qualitative results. 
6 An L-type will deviate only when the left hand side of (8) is sufficiently larger than the right hand side. 
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the high level of sacrifice. Conversely, (6), (7), and (8) indicate that when price effects 
are small, a pooling equilibrium can only exist when there are a sufficiently large number 
of L-type players and ݏ஽  > ݏ௉כ . This is true for all possible deviations, so the only pooling 
equilibrium that can emerge is in the lowest sacrifice group – where a large number of L-
type players who give nothing to the group provide incentive to stay in the group and not 
deviate for a higher group payout in a higher sacrifice group. 
These results suggest that if we see pooling in the experiment, it should either be 
in the highest or lowest sacrifice groups. If it is in the highest sacrifice group, subjects 
should exhibit significant price effects, while if it is in the lowest sacrifice group, price 
effects should play little role in the behavior of the subjects. 
3.2.2.  Perfect Screening Equilibria 
In the other classes of equilibria, more than one sacrifice group is chosen in equilibrium.7 
We denote one of these classes a “perfect screening equilibrium” since H-type players 
screen out all L-types by choosing high sacrifice groups, while L-type players choose low 
sacrifice groups. This equilibrium holds under some conditions because H-type players 
give more to the group and thus lose less from high sacrifice. 
For analytical simplicity, ignore the one mixed group that may emerge if H and L-
types do not fit evenly into groups. In equilibrium, L-types must choose the lowest 
sacrifice level possible, denoted ݏ௅כ. Otherwise, an L-type would have incentive to deviate 
to a lower sacrifice level. Hence, L-types receive utility v(1 – ݏ௅כ) in equilibrium. 
Meanwhile, all H-types choose the same group (since they have the same 
objective function), denoted ݏுכ , where ݏுכ  > ݏ௅כ.  If L-types deviate to ݏுכ , they receive 
utility v(1 – ݏுכ + r(G – 1)g*(ݏுכ )). Hence, the equilibrium only holds if: 
(9)  ݏுכ  – ݏ௅כ > r(G – 1)g*(ݏுכ ). 
Conversely, H-types derive the following utility in equilibrium: 
(10)  v((1 – ݏுכ )(1 – g*(ݏுכ )) + rGg*(ݏுכ )) + u(g*(ݏுכ ),(G – 1)g*(ݏுכ )) 
However, if H-types deviate to ݏ௅כ, they receive: 
(11)  v((1 – ݏ௅כ)(1 – g*(ݏ௅כ)) + rg*(ݏ௅כ)) + u(g*(ݏ௅כ), 0) 
                                                 
7 Makowsky (2010) offers an alternative variation on the club theory of religion that produces an outcome 
with successful groups employing a range of sacrifice rates. In a similar manner to the model presented 
here, Makowsky distinguishes between “weak” screening and “strong” screening.   
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Comparing (10) with (11), it is clear that a perfect screening equilibrium cannot hold if 
price effects are sufficiently small. Otherwise, H-types do not receive a great enough 
return from the group to make up for the amount lost to sacrifice. Combined with (9), this 
suggests that a perfect screening equilibrium can only hold if price effects are not too 
large or too small. More formally, there is some range over which price effects must fall 
in order for a perfect screening to exist. The intuition behind this result is that if price 
effects are large (and H-types give a significant amount to the group), L-types will have 
incentive to enter the group consisting of only H-types, even though this entails more 
sacrifice. Conversely, if price effects are small and H-types give little to the group 
(relative to how much they give at lower sacrifice levels), H-types have incentive to enter 
the low sacrifice group, foregoing a slightly higher group payout in order to receive a 
lower sacrifice rate. 
The primary prediction emerging from this analysis is that if a perfect screening 
emerges, then higher sacrifice groups will have higher group payouts. However, the 
overall payout (group + private) will be greater in the low sacrifice groups. 
3.2.3.  “Imperfect” Screening Equilibria 
Is it possible for an equilibrium to exist if free-riders (L-types) are not “perfectly” 
screened out? In reality, it is rare that mechanisms which are employed to reduce free-
riding will eliminate all instances of free-riding – a successful mechanism merely needs 
to reduce free-riding. In this section, we analyze the conditions under which some, but 
not all, free riders (L-types) are screened out of sacrifice groups. 
Perfect screening equilibria do not exist when price effects (డ௚
כ
డ௦כ) are sufficiently 
large. In this case, L-type players have incentive to join high sacrifice groups and obtain 
the higher group payout while giving nothing to the group. Such actions may be part of 
an “imperfect” screening equilibrium, however. We denote  L-types who enter high 
sacrifice groups as “infiltrators”, formally defined as: 
 
Definition 1: An infiltrator is an L-type player who joins a high sacrifice group. 
 
An “imperfect” screening equilibrium arises when some L-type players infiltrate high 
sacrifice groups. When this happens, sacrifice groups are less attractive to other potential 
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infiltrators for two reasons. First, the expected group payout from these groups is lower. 
Secondly, the riskiness of joining these groups is greater, since there is a nontrivial 
probability the one will join a group with an infiltrator and receive both a lower private 
and group payout. However, there is a limit to the number of infiltrators that can join any 
one high sacrifice group. If there are too many infiltrators, the expected payout in the 
high sacrifice groups will be too low and infiltrators have incentive to leave the group. 
If free-riders are imperfectly screened, some L-type players choose a low sacrifice 
group (ݏ௅כ) and some L and all H-type players choose a high sacrifice group (ݏுכ ). The 
conditions under which such an equilibrium hold are seen by analyzing the decision of 
the L-types. If they enter the low sacrifice group, they will be placed with other L-types 
and receive utility v(1 – ݏ௅כ). If they “infiltrate” the high sacrifice group, they receive 
expected utility: 
(12)  E[U] = Pr(one L in group)·v(1 – ݏுכ + r(G – 1)g*(ݏுכ )) + Pr(two L in 
group)·v(1 – ݏுכ + r(G – 2)g*(ݏுכ )) + … Pr(all L in group)·v(1 – ݏுכ ) 
It is clear by comparing (12) with v(1 – ݏ௅כ) that as long as H-types contribute 
enough for at least one L-type to deviate, an “imperfect” screening equilibrium will 
always exist. Moreover, the bigger that g*(ݏுכ ) is, the more infiltrators there will be in 
equilibrium. The intuition is that when H-types give more to the group, it makes 
infiltrating more desirable. However, each additional L-type infiltrating makes infiltrating 
less desirable, since it decreases the expected return from joining the high sacrifice group. 
An equilibrium number of infiltrators thus emerges that balances out these two forces. 
Since the payout associated with infiltrating is risky, it must also be true that the 
expected payout is greater for both types in high sacrifice groups than it is in low 
sacrifice groups. An equilibrium emerges only when infiltrators receive a “sacrifice 
premium” where a balance is struck between higher expected payouts in high sacrifice 
groups and lower risk in low sacrifice groups. Indeed, there must be some positive 
probability of infiltrators decreasing there earnings by entering high sacrifice groups – 
otherwise, infiltrating is always a best response. 
This logic entails that in an “imperfect” screening equilibrium, the following 
predictions arise. 
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Hypothesis 1 (Price effects and screening I): Average contributions to the group 
account will be higher in high sacrifice groups than in low sacrifice groups. 
Hypothesis 2 (Price effects and screening II): The total payout (group + private) will be 
greater for players in high sacrifice groups than in low sacrifice groups. 
Hypothesis 3 (Sacrifice Premium): A small premium will be available (for free-riders) 
from joining high sacrifice groups relative to low sacrifice groups. 
Hypothesis 4 (Payout Risk): There is a positive probability of obtaining a lower total 
payout by infiltrating high sacrifice groups relative to low sacrifice groups. 
Hypothesis 5 (Infiltrators): There will exist a positive number of “infiltrators” – that is, 
subjects who choose high sacrifice groups and then contribute little to the group. 
 
4. Results 
The experiment was conducted at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science 
(ICES) at George Mason University.  Subjects were randomly recruited from the George 
Mason student body.  In addition to any amount earned in the experiment, each subject 
received five dollars for arriving to the laboratory on time.  Subjects spent about two and 
a half hours in the laboratory and earned about $23 on average (including quiz and show-
up fees).  We report data from 120 subjects in eight sessions of the experiment as well as 
data from 40 subjects in three additional control sessions (reported in Section 4.3). 60 
subjects participated in each of the two possible orders of play: “Experienced” (Round 1 
Normal VCM; Round 2 Sacrifice VCM; Round 3 Sacrifice VCM) and “Inexperienced” 
(Round 1 Sacrifice VCM; Round 2 Normal VCM; Round 3 Sacrifice VCM).8  All control 
session subjects participated in the “Inexperienced” game. Before making their VCM 
game decisions, subjects read the instructions while an experimenter read the instructions 
out loud.  Subjects answered graded quiz questions and received $0.25 for each correct 
answer.9 Subjects were unaware each round whether there would be a subsequent round, 
though they were informed they would play that round only once with their current set of 
group members. 
                                                 
8 Each ordering consisted of three sessions of 16 subjects and one session of 12 subjects.  
9 On average (in Experienced and Inexperienced sessions) subjects answered 7.5 questions right out of 9 on 
their first try. 
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In the following sections, we consider the 5 hypotheses associated with the 
“imperfect” screening equilibrium denoted in the model. Although it is not clear ex ante 
which equilibrium will emerge, the “imperfect” screening equilibrium has by far the least 
restrictive conditions and is also the one most commonly found empirically. 
 
4.1.Unconditional Contributions 
Average unconditional contribution rates provide initial insight into the effect of 
sacrifice. As discussed in the previous section, we expect subjects to endogenously form 
two general types of groups: ‘non-sacrifice’ groups (those with private account return 
rates 1 – si = 0.95E$s) and ‘sacrifice’ groups (those with private account return rates 1 – 
si < 0.95 E$s).  
Hypothesis 1 of the model predicts that the average unconditional contribution to 
the group account is higher in sacrifice groups than in non-sacrifice groups. This is what 
we find. As illustrated in Figure 1, subjects in sacrifice groups contributed significantly 
more to the group account, regardless of game-play order.10 In the second round, subjects 
in sacrifice groups also (unconditionally) contributed more to the group account. The 
lighter shaded bars show that subjects in sacrifice groups in the first sacrifice round of the 
Experienced ordering contributed an average of 3.75 E$s to the group account while 
subjects in non-sacrifice groups each contributed an average of 1.34 E$s.  This difference 
is significant at a 1% level (2-sided Mann-Whitney test, p-value < 0.01). The difference 
between contributions made by those in sacrifice versus non-sacrifice groups is also 
significant in both the first sacrifice round of the Inexperienced ordering (p < 0.01) and 
the second sacrifice round (p < 0.01).  
                                                 
10 All reported results are based on the sacrifice level used by subjects. The results are qualitatively similar 
if broken down by sacrifice level chosen. That is, the mechanism that we employ to group subjects is not 
driving the results. The results broken down by sacrifice level chosen are available upon request.  
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Figure 1: Average Unconditional Contribution to Group Account in Sacrifice VCM 
Round 
 
 
In both the Experienced and Inexperienced ordering, we observed the formation 
of seven sacrifice groups (1 – s* < 0.95) and eight non-sacrifice groups (1 – s* = 0.95). 
35 (34) subjects in the Experienced (Inexperienced) order chose a private account return 
rate of 0.95 E$s per token while 25 (26) chose a private account return rate of less than 
0.95 E$s per token.11 The distribution of private account return choices by subjects is not 
significantly different between the Experienced and Inexperienced orderings (Kruskal-
Wallis test, p=0.72). Moreover, there is no statistically significant difference in the 
average difference between the amount given to the group by those in the sacrifice versus 
                                                 
11 Within each treatment, one session involved only 12 participants, instead of 16. These sessions both 
broke up into two non-sacrifice groups and one sacrifice group. We observed 2 subjects who chose 
sacrifice yet participated in groups with a private account return rate of 0.95, and 4 subjects who chose 1 – 
s = 0.95, yet participated in groups with private account return rates of less than 0.95. 
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non-sacrifice group in the first round (the average difference is 2.41 in the Experienced 
ordering and 2.39 in the Inexperienced ordering). These results indicate that order effects 
are not driving the observed outcomes. 
Next, we consider the relationship between the unconditional contribution and the 
sacrifice level across all sacrifice levels. Hypothesis 1 suggests that there should be a 
negative (positive) correlation between group return (sacrifice level) and group 
contribution. This is confirmed in Figure 2, which displays the average unconditional 
contribution to the group account for each observed level of private account return rate 
for a group.  As the private account return used by a group increases, the observed 
decreasing trend in average unconditional contributions is significant at a 1% level.  The 
trend is significant for Experienced (Cuzick trend test, p < 0.01) and Inexperienced (p < 
0.01) orderings separately or pooled (p < 0.01), as well as the second sacrifice round 
(pooled, p < 0.01). 
Figure 2: Average Unconditional Contribution to Group Account 
 
Next, we consider Hypothesis 2, which states that the total payout (group + 
private) will be greater for players in high sacrifice groups than in low sacrifice groups, 
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but not by much. In the model, this outcome arises because the gains from joining high 
sacrifice groups cannot be too large (or infiltrating would be optimal and no one would 
join low sacrifice groups) or negative (otherwise no one would join high sacrifice groups, 
which have riskier payouts). 
Figure 3 supports this hypothesis. This figure shows the average payout – the 
return from the group plus private account – in the first (pooled) and second (pooled) 
sacrifice rounds. The trend is slightly negative. The negative trend is statistically 
significant in the second sacrifice round(Cuzick trend test, p < 0.01) and marginally 
significant (p = 0.08) for the first round. Indeed, the model predicts that the slope should 
be negative but not very steep (though how steep the slope needs to be for equilibrium to 
hold is dependent on the model’s parameters). Hence, these results suggest that the 
average individual payout is slightly increasing (decreasing) in sacrifice (private account 
return rate).12 
                                                 
12 Analysis of the first and second sacrifice rounds without pooling the Experienced and Inexeperienced 
subjects provides further evidence that the trend is only slightly negative.  In the first sacrifice round the 
marginally significant payout trend exists only with the Experienced subjects (p = 0.08) but not with the 
Inexperienced subjects (p = 0.37).  Similarly, the decreasing trend in the second sacrifice round occurs only 
with the inexperienced subjects (p < 0.01) and less so with the experienced subjects (p = 0.12). 
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Figure 3: Average Individual Payout 
 
4.2.Conditional Contributions 
The use of the Fischbacher et al. (2001) style VCM game in our experiment allows us to 
observe a subject’s unconditional contributions and conditional contributions to the group 
account.  The conditional contributions permit us to determine whether each subject is a 
conditional cooperator, a free-rider, a ‘hump-shaped’ contributor (a.k.a. ‘triangle’ 
contributor), or an ‘other’ type, as found in Fischbacher et al. (2001).  For each of the 
three rounds of a session, we typed each subject, using procedures based on those 
outlined in Fischbacher et al. (2001).13 
                                                 
13 A “conditional cooperator” is a subject whose conditional contributions to the group account are 
increasing and (weakly) monotonic or has a positive significant (1%) Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient. Free-riders are subjects who never contribute anything to the group account (a few subjects are 
typed as free-riders who gave a total of 1 over all 11 possible average other contributions).  ‘Hump-shaped’ 
contributors are subjects whose conditional contributions followed a general triangular path, with 
contributions that increase (like a conditional cooperator) but then decrease as the average contribution 
level of other group members gets high. ‘Other’ combines subjects whose decisions do not follow one of 
the other three types well. Supplementary documents, available by request, indicate precisely how each 
subject was typed. 
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Figure 4: Subject "Types" and Conditional Contributions 
 
The average conditional contributions (in the normal VCM round) for each 
subject type illustrated in Figure 4 demonstrate how each type receives its name.  We 
observe that (Experienced and Inexperienced pooled) 40.8% of subjects in the Normal 
VCM round are conditional cooperators, 25.8% are free-riders, 11.7% ‘hump-shaped’ 
contributors, and 13.3% other.  A similar pooled distribution of types is seen in the 
Sacrifice VCM round where we observe 44.5% conditional cooperators, 26.1% free-
riders, 15.1% ‘hump-shaped’ contributors, and 14.3% others.14 
Typing subjects by their conditional contributions in the sacrifice round allows for 
a further test of the power of unproductive costs to screen free riders from those who 
contribute to the group (all other types). Figure 5 summarizes the fraction of each type 
that chose a sacrifice group in each sacrifice round. Free-riders choose sacrifice groups 
                                                 
14In their standard VCM games, Fischbacher et al. (2001) found 50%, 30%, 14%, and 6% of their subjects 
were conditional cooperators, free-riders, hump-shaped contributors, and other typed, respectively.  
Fischbacher and Gächter (2009) found 55.0%, 22.9%, 12.1% and 10.0% of their subjects were conditional 
cooperators, free-riders, hump-shaped contributors, and other typed, respectively. 
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less frequently than the other three types.15 Free riders choose sacrifice groups only 16.1-
16.7% of the time whereas the other types choose sacrifice groups 41.7-58.8% of the 
time. The difference between free riders and all other types is significant at the 1% level 
for both the first and second sacrifice rounds (Mann-Whitney Two-Tailed, p < 0.01 for 
each).16 
 
Figure 5: Percentage of Each Type Choosing a Sacrifice Group 
 
Next, we look at the make-up of sacrifice groups and non-sacrifice groups.  While 
Figure 5 demonstrates the differences in decision-making of the types, Figure 6 shows us 
how the groups differ in their composition. Our theory predicts that sacrifice groups 
should be made up of relatively fewer free-riders and relatively more conditional 
cooperators.  Figure 6 supports this prediction. 40.6% of the 64 subjects in Non-Sacrifice 
groups are free-riders while only 9.1% of the 55 subjects in Sacrifice groups are free-
                                                 
15 Note that we delineate subjects by their choice of groups, not the groups they actually played. 
16 The first sacrifice round significant difference is found for Experienced subjects (p < 0.01) and 
marginally for Inexperienced subjects (p = 0.07).  There is also a significant difference (p < 0.05) in the 
second sacrifice round for both Experienced and Inexperienced subjects.  
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riders (Mann-Whitney two-tailed, p < 0.01).17  Similarly, there are significantly more 
conditional cooperators in Sacrifice groups (54.5%) than in Non-Sacrifice groups (35.9%, 
p=0.04).18 
Figure 6: Composition of Sacrifice and Non-Sacrifice Groups (First Sacrifice Round) 
 (A) Sacrifice Groups (B) Non-Sacrifice Groups 
 
Figure 5 and 6 provide some preliminary evidence that unproductive costs act as a 
mechanism which screens free-riders from other “types”. However, the model presented 
in this paper and Iannaccone (1992) identify two phenomena that could be driving these 
results: screening and price effects. That is, while it appears that different “types” are 
joining different groups, it is also possible that subjects who choose non-sacrifice groups 
are more likely to free ride after choosing the group, as the marginal cost of giving to the 
group is greater in these groups. In naturally occurring groups (outside of the laboratory), 
these two effects are indistinguishable, as high-sacrifice groups screen via changes in 
relative prices and the two are thus generally found together. In the laboratory, however, 
we have numerous mechanisms to distinguish between these two effects. 
First, we look at Experienced subjects “typed” by their conditional contributions 
in the Normal (non-sacrifice) round. The benefit of concentrating on this subset is that we 
can see their choices in a setting where there are no price effects (differences in the 
private account return rate). We then analyze whether each type subsequently chooses to 
be part of a sacrifice group or a non-sacrifice group.  We only show the results for the 
Experienced subjects, since Inexperienced subjects do not play the Normal VCM game 
                                                 
17 The significant difference holds for both Experienced (p < 0.01) and Inexperienced (p = 0.04) groups.  
18 The significant difference holds for Experienced subjects (p = 0.04) but not Inexperienced subjects (p = 
0.41). 
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before making their sacrifice group choice.  Figure 7 reports the portion of each 
Experienced subject type that chose a private account return rate less than 0.95 in the first 
sacrifice round. It is evident that the main results of Figure 5 and 6 hold, as not a single 
free-rider chose to join a sacrifice group. The other three types (conditional cooperators, 
hump-shaped, and others) chose positive levels of sacrifice significantly more than did 
free-riders (Mann-Whitney Two-tailed, p < 0.01). 
 
Figure 7: First Sacrifice VCM Round Choice by Normal VCM Round Type  
 
While these results do not indicate that price effects are absent, they suggest that 
screening effects are present. Subjects prone to free riding make fundamentally different 
choices than others. Yet, these results do not confirm the presence of screening, as 
comparing subjects’ actions across rounds may confound screening and learning effects. 
For example, subjects’ past initial group experiences (if they were in a particularly stingy 
or giving group) may affect their future decisions. In the next section, we remove the 
endogenous group formation aspect of the design in order to eliminate the screening 
element completely. 
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4.3.Controlling for Screening: Exogenous (Random) Sorting 
The results presented in Section 4.2 do not fully differentiate between price and screening 
effects in relation to group contributions. It is possible that either differences in relative 
prices or differences in subject “types” (or both) underlie the observation that greater 
contributions are given in higher sacrifice groups (Figure 1 and Figure 2).  
We confront this problem by running three additional control sessions with 
exogenous group assignment. As in the inexperienced sessions, subjects are split into 
groups of 4 and play a Sacrifice VCM game followed by a Normal VCM game and then 
one additional Sacrifice VCM game. Unlike the previous treatments, however, subjects 
do not choose their groups. Instead, they are randomly assigned to one of three group 
types – High Sacrifice, Medium Sacrifice, or Low Sacrifice – differentiated by the rate of 
return to the private account (0.60, 0.75, or 0.95).19 
 The control sessions help shed light on the role that the screening plays in the 
observed differences in contributions over varying sacrifice levels. If screening is indeed 
occurring, then we expect contributions in high-sacrifice groups to be greater in trials 
where groups sort endogenously, as free-riders are screened out of these groups under 
endogenous sorting but not under random sorting. On the other hand, we expect 
contributions in low-sacrifice groups to be lower in trials where groups sort 
endogenously, since free-riders are screened into these groups under endogenous sorting 
but not under random sorting. 
Figure 8 suggests that the screening of free riders does explain at least some of the 
observed differences in group contributions. First, note that unconditional contributions 
are larger in high sacrifice groups under endogenous sorting than under random sorting. 
This difference is significant at the 1% level (Mann Whitney two-tailed, p < 0.05 in the 
first and second sacrifice rounds). Meanwhile, unconditional contributions are smaller in 
non-sacrifice groups, significantly in the first sacrifice round under endogenous sorting (p 
< 0.01) though not significantly in the second sacrifice round (p = 0.20). There is no 
significant difference (p > 0.20) for medium levels of sacrifice between endogenous and 
                                                 
19 All subjects participated in the Inexperienced ordering. The results are compared in this section to those 
found under endogenous sorting combining the Experienced and Inexperienced orderings. All results hold 
when comparing the control to only the Inexperienced ordering under endogenous sorting. 
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exogenous sorting for either the first or second sacrifice rounds. These results suggest 
that unproductive costs serve to screen free riders out of high-sacrifice groups. 
 
Figure 8: Endogenous vs. Random Comparison, Average Unconditional Contribution, 
Multiple Groups 
 
4.4.Infiltrators, Payout Risk, and the Sacrifice Premium 
Finally, we turn back to Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 from the model. These hypotheses 
outlined conditions which must hold for an (imperfect screening) equilibrium to exist. 
These are, namely, that a small premium will be available (for free-riders) from joining 
high sacrifice groups (Hypothesis 3), there is a positive, nontrivial probability of 
obtaining a lower total payout by infiltrating high sacrifice groups (Hypothesis 4), and 
that there will exist a positive number of “infiltrators” (Hypothesis 5). 
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Figure 9: Potential Marginal Profit from Free Rider Infiltration 
 
Figure 9 supports all three of these hypotheses. This figure shows i) the average 
marginal profit a free-rider makes by choosing each group (relative to group 1 – s = 0.95) 
and ii) the number of free riders who infiltrated each group.20 The average additional 
profit attainable by infiltrating was calculated by averaging the contribution of the 3 other 
group members for each subject who chose a given group, using this as the total group 
contribution (since free riders give 0). This was compared to the average contribution of 
the 3 other group members for subjects who chose group 1 – s = 0.95. Note that the 
horizontal axis is private account return chosen, instead of private account return used. 
We use these data because the choice of group, not the group one ends up in, is the salient 
one from the infiltrator’s point of view. The results are qualitatively similar if the private 
account return used is placed on the horizontal axis. 
Figure 9 suggests that for most group choices, a small premium exists (on 
average) for infiltrating (Hypothesis 3), and a small number of infiltrators existed in 
                                                 
20 The data in Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11 use only the endogenous sorting data. 
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almost every group (Hypothesis 5).21 The theory underlying these hypotheses is that if the 
premium is too large, everyone will want to infiltrate, whereas if the premium is too 
small, no one will want to join the high sacrifice groups, which have riskier returns. We 
find that for most groups, the premium is indeed small – 1E$ or less (or, less than 10% of 
the total income made in one round). Note, however, that in the second round, the 
average marginal profit from infiltrating certain groups is negative. This provides support 
for Hypothesis 4, which claims that there is a non-trivial probability that infiltrating will 
decrease the return made by a free-rider. Infiltrating high-sacrifice groups is risky – 
infiltrators are giving up a sure bet of 9.5 tokens in the 1 – s = 0.95 group for a bet that 
the group payout will be at least 4 tokens higher in the 1 – s = 0.55 group (a similar logic 
works for medium sacrifice groups).  
The riskiness of the higher-sacrifice groups is supported further in Figure 10 and 
Figure 11. Figure 10 reveals that the marginal profit from infiltrating can be quite 
positive or quite negative.22 In other words, infiltrating is a risky proposition – the 
rewards may be significant, but so may the losses – while the average gain is small. In 
fact, Figure 11 suggests that the average gain is positive only around 50% of the time. 
This figure shows the ex post probability that a free-rider benefits from infiltrating 
(relative to choosing the non-sacrifice group). The probabilities hover around 50%, with 
the probability of obtaining a positive marginal gain from joining the highest sacrifice 
group (1 – s – 0.55) at 50.3%. Although we do not explicitly test or model risk aversion, 
these data indicate that risk aversion provides a source of heterogeneity beyond one’s 
propensity to give to the group (or “type”). We do not wish to push this point too far, as 
we do not control for different levels of risk aversion. We only note that the presence of 
such infiltrating individuals is essential for the equilibrium to hold, that the rewards to 
free-riding in high sacrifice groups are more appealing to less risk averse individuals, and 
that their presence in the experiment provides evidence that unproductive costs can serve 
as a useful mechanism to screen out most, but not all, free riders.  
                                                 
21 The number of infiltrators in Figure 9 is the total across all 8 sessions using endogenous sorting. 
22 The numbers in Figure 10 are calculated by comparing the best (worst) case scenario at 1 – s = 0.95 with 
the worst (best) scenario at each group to derive the minimum (maximum) marginal profit. 
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Figure 10: Minimum and Maximum Marginal Profit from Free Rider Infiltration 
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Figure 7: Ex Post Probability of Infiltrator Making a Positive Gain, at Different Levels of 
Private Return 
 
5. Conclusion 
While the experimental literature has revealed a great deal about the impact of 
exogenously imposed rules on group outcomes, particularly with relation to cooperation, 
much remains to be learned about how and why groups form endogenously.  We 
demonstrate the value of rules for a group that emerge within a meaningful social 
context. This experiment shows that cooperation can be fostered when individuals are 
given the opportunity to endogenously choose the rule structure – in this case, the amount 
of unproductive costs undertaken – of the groups they join. Our results indicate that rules 
which increase the cost of actions group members take outside of the group serve to 
screen out free-riders and encourage more cooperative in-group behavior. 
The salient features of sacrifice requirements in the VCM game are their ability to 
harness the productive capacity of groups and at the same time offer a simple, straight 
forward means for groups to emerge without direction from an outside force or authority. 
Sacrifice, as an accepted social norm or institution, allows individuals with shared 
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objectives and similar preferences to engage in risky, interdependent public production 
and come out ahead. 
Our results offer strong laboratory evidence for the efficacy of sacrifice 
requirements as a means of both incentivizing agents to make greater contributions to 
public goods and to sort agents by type through a self-selection mechanism. The sacrifice 
norm is a means by which members can come closer to Pareto optimality by screening 
out those who do not share their preferred means of social production and do so without 
recourse to exogenous authority or coercion. Beyond simply screening out free-riders, 
sacrifice serves to attract conditional cooperators – agents who see the merits of group 
production but who might otherwise be dissuaded by the prospect of rational defecting 
behavior by other agents.  
The experimental structure allows groups composed of agents with similar 
preferences and utility maximizing strategies to form without exogenous direction. While 
Iannaccone’s original theory of sacrifice and stigma was conceived with direct relevance 
for religious groups, the mechanism functioned in an anonymous laboratory setting 
absent any group identity or religious context. Further, the mechanism served not just to 
overcome free-riding, but as a means for subjects to self-sort by type and endogenously 
form cooperative groups with minimal interference or manipulation. 
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Appendix A: Experiment Instructions 
 
Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. You have earned a $5 show-up bonus 
for participating. If you read and follow the instructions below carefully, you have the 
potential to earn significantly more. In the experiment you will earn Experimental Dollars 
(E$s) which will be converted into cash (US Dollars) at the end of the experiment. For 
every 2 E$s you have at the end of the experiment you will be paid 1 US Dollar in 
cash. During the experiment, you and the other 15 people participating will be placed 
into groups of 4. You will not be told the names of those in your group and they will not 
be told your name. All participants have identical instructions.  
 
The decision situation 
  
Each member of your group will have to allocate 10 tokens.  You can put these 10 tokens 
in a private account or you can put them fully or partially into a group account.  Each 
token you do not put into the group account will automatically be transferred into your 
private account. You will receive E$s based upon the number of tokens in your private 
account and the total number of tokens in the group account. We explain below how 
you earn money in each account. 
 
Your income from the private account  
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For each token you put in your private account you will earn a number of E$s.  For 
example, if the return to the private account is 1 E$ for every token, then if you put 10 
tokens in your private account (which implies that you do not put anything into the 
group account) you will earn exactly 10 E$.  If you put 6 tokens into the private 
account, you will receive an income of 6 E$s from the private account.  For another 
example, if the return to the private account is 0.5 E$s for every token, then if you put 
10 tokens in your private account (which implies that you do not put anything into the 
group account) you will earn exactly 5 E$.  If you put 6 tokens into the private account, 
you will receive an income of 3 E$s from the private account.  Nobody except yourself 
earns E$s from your private account. You will be told what the return to the private 
account is before you make your decision. 
 
Your income from the group account 
 
From the token amount you put into the group account, each group member (including 
you) will get the same number of E$s.  Of course, you will also get E$s from the tokens 
the other group members put into the group account.  For each group member the 
income from the group account will be determined as follows: 
 
Income from the group account = sum of tokens put into the group account x 0.4 
 
For example, if the sum of all contributions to the group account is 30 tokens, then you 
and all the other group members will get a payoff of 30 x 0.4= 12 E$s from the group 
account.  If the four group members together put 5 tokens into the group account, you 
and all others will get 5 x 0.4 = 2 E$s from the group account. 
 
Your total income 
 
Your total income is the summation of your income from your private account and your 
income from the group account. 
 
Income from your private account (=10 – contribution to the group account) + Income 
from the group account (= 0.4 x Sum of contributions to the group account) = total 
income. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Quiz to ensure understanding of how you earn money from each account. 
You will receive $0.25 (US Dollars) for each complete correct answer to the following 
four questions. The purpose is to make you familiar with the calculation of incomes that 
come from different decisions about the allocation of 10 tokens. 
 
For each of the following questions, suppose that the return to the private account is 
1E$s per token: 
 
1) Each group member has 10 tokens at his or her disposal.  Assume that none of the four 
group members (including you) contributes anything to the group account.  What will 
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your total income be?  ______   What is the total income of each of the other group 
members? ______ 
 
2) Each group member has 10 tokens at his or her disposal. Assume that you invest 10 
tokens into the group account and each of the other group members also invests 10 
tokens into the group account.  What will your total income be? ______ What is the 
total income of each of the other group members? ___ 
 
3) Each group member has 10 tokens at his or her disposal. Assume that the other three 
group members together contribute a total of 15 tokens to the group account. 
 
What is your total income if you – in addition to the 15 tokens – contribute 0 tokens to 
the group account? ______ 
What is your total income if you – in addition to the 15 tokens – contribute 5 tokens to 
the group account? ______ 
What is your total income if you – in addition to the 15 tokens – contribute 10 tokens to 
the group account? ______ 
 
4) Each group member has 10 tokens at his or her disposal.  Assume that you invest 4 
tokens to the group account. 
 
What is your total income if the other group members - in addition to your 4 tokens - 
together contribute a total of 4 tokens to the group account?_____ 
What is your total income if the other group members - in addition to your 4 tokens - 
together contribute a total of 6 tokens to the group account?_____ 
What is your total income if the other group members - in addition to your 4 tokens - 
together contribute a total of 11 tokens to the group account?_____ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Each person has two types of decisions to make. One of these two decisions will 
determine how many tokens you place in each account.  See the attached decision sheet 
that you will later be filling out. 
 
Decision 1 
 
Indicate on the box provided for Decision 1 how many of your 10 tokens you wish to 
contribute to the group account (this will indicate that you wish to place 10 minus this 
many tokens in to your private account.) This decision is made without knowing the 
decisions of your other three group members (in other words, an “unconditional 
contribution.”) 
 
Decision 2 
 
For Decision 2, you will fill out a “contribution table”.  In the contribution table you will 
indicate for each possible average contribution of the other group members (rounded to 
the nearest integer) how many tokens you want to contribute to the group account.  You 
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can condition your contribution on the contribution of the other group members.  This 
will be immediately clear if you take a look at the following table. 
 
 
The numbers next to the input boxes are the possible (rounded) average contributions of 
the other group members to the group account.  You simply have to insert into each input 
box how many tokens you will contribute to the group account – conditional on the 
indicated average contribution. You have to make an entry into each box.  For example, 
you will have to indicate how much you contribute to the group account if the others 
contribute an average of 0 tokens to the group account, how much you contribute if the 
others contribute an average of 1, 2, or 3 tokens, etc.  In each input box you can write any 
number from 0 to 10. 
 
After each member of your group has made both decisions, a die roll will randomly select 
one group member.  The Decision 2 (from the contribution table) of this randomly 
selected group member will be used to determine their contribution to the group account 
(and their private account).  The Decision 1 (the “unconditional contribution”) of the 
other three group members will determine their contribution to the group account (and 
their private account.)  When you make your Decision 1 and 2, you of course do not 
know whether the die roll will select you.  You will therefore have to think carefully 
about both types of decisions because both can become relevant for you. 
 
EXAMPLE 1: Assume that you have been selected by the random mechanism.  
This implies that your relevant decision will be your contribution table (your 
Decision 2).  For the other three group members their unconditional contribution 
(Decision 1) is the relevant decision.  Assume they have made unconditional 
contributions to the group account of 0, 1, and 2 tokens.  The average 
contribution of these three group members, therefore, is 1 token.  If you have 
indicated in your contribution table that you will contribute 1 token to the group 
Average Number of 
Tokens the Other 
Members of Your Group 
Placed in the Group 
Account
How Many 
Tokens You Will 
Place in the 
Group Account
Average Number of 
Tokens the Other 
Members of Your Group 
Placed in the Group 
Account
How Many 
Tokens You Will 
Place in the 
Group Account
1
10
8
6
7
9
4
2
0
5
3
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account if the others contribute 1 token on average, then the total contribution to 
the group account is given by 0 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 4 tokens.  All group members, 
therefore, earn .4 x 4=1.6 E$s from the group account plus their respective income 
from the private account.  If you have instead indicated in your contribution table 
that you will contribute 9 tokens if the others contribute one token on average, 
then the total contribution of the group to the group account is given by 0 + 1 + 2 
+ 9 = 12.  All group members therefore earn .4 x 12 =4.8 E$s from the group 
account plus their respective income from the private account. 
  
EXAMPLE 2: Assume that you have not been selected by the random mechanism 
which implies that for you and two other group members Decision 1 (the 
unconditional contribution) is taken as the payoff-relevant decision.  Assume your 
unconditional contribution to the group account is 8 tokens and those of the other 
two group members is 9 and 10 tokens.  The average unconditional contribution 
of you and the two other group members, therefore, is 9 tokens.  If the group 
member who has been selected by the random mechanism indicates in her 
contribution table that she will contribute 1 token to the group account if the 
other three group members contribute on average 9 tokens, then the total 
contribution of the group to the group account is given by 8 + 9 + 10 + 1 == 28 
tokens.  All group members will therefore earn .4 x 28 = 11.2 E$s from the group 
account plus their respective income from the private account.  If instead the 
randomly selected group member indicates in her contribution table that she 
contributes 10 if the others contribute on average 9 tokens, then the total 
contribution of that group to the group account is 8 + 9 + 10 + 10 = 37 tokens.  
All group members will therefore earn .4 x 37 = 14.8 E$s from the group account 
plus their respective income from the private account. 
 
The random selection of the participant whose Decision 2 (from the contribution table) 
will be used in each group proceeds as follows.  Each group member is assigned a 
number between 1 and 4.  A participant will be randomly selected to throw a six-sided 
die until a number between 1 and 4 is thrown.  The number that shows up will be entered 
into the computer.  If the thrown number is the same as that assigned to you, then for you, 
your Decision 2 (from the contribution table) will be relevant and for the other group 
members Decision 1 (the unconditional contribution) will be the payoff-relevant decision.  
Otherwise, your Decision 1 is the relevant decision.  The die roll will occur after 
everyone has turned in his or her decisions. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Quiz:  You will receive $0.25 (US Dollars) for each complete correct answer to the 
following two questions. 
 
Suppose the other members of your group place 3, 5, and 7 tokens into the group 
account, and that you have been randomly selected to have your Decision 2 (from the 
contribution table) used. 
 
Question 1) Which box in the Decision 2 contribution table would contain the number of 
tokens you would place into the group account?  
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The box next to number _________ 
 
Question 2) How many of the other three members of your group will have their   
         
Unconditional Contribution (Decision 1) used? ______ 
       Contribution Table (Decision 2) used? ______ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Decision 1:  
Group account        
 
Indicate, in the box above, for Decision 1 (the unconditional contribution) how many of 
your 10 tokens you wish to contribute to the group account (indicating you wish to place 
10 minus this number of tokens into your private account.) This decision is made 
without knowing the decisions of your group members. 
 
Decision 2: 
On the Decision 2 table, please fill in each box with the number of tokens you want to 
contribute to the group account for each possible average number of tokens that each of 
the other members of your group could place into the group account. 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
You have been randomly matched with a group of four people for these decisions. 
The private account pays 1E$ for every token you place in your private account.  
 
Average Number of 
Tokens the Other 
Members of Your Group 
Placed in the Group 
Account
How Many 
Tokens You Will 
Place in the 
Group Account
Average Number of 
Tokens the Other 
Members of Your Group 
Placed in the Group 
Account
How Many 
Tokens You Will 
Place in the 
Group Account
1
10
8
6
7
9
4
2
0
5
3
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The group account pays you 0.4E$s for every token placed in the group account by you 
or the other group members you are randomly assigned to this round.  
 
You will play this game only once. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
You will now make a decision that can affect the return to the private account in your 
group. Circle below how many E$s per token you would like the private account to 
return for the group you are placed in.  You will be placed in a group with others who 
chose a similar amount to you.  This will be done as follows: 
 
After everyone has circled a level of return, the monitor will collect these decisions and 
place them in numerical order from highest to lowest (in case multiple people chose the 
same number, the order will be determined randomly amongst those people by rolling a 
die.)  The first four people in the list will be in a group together, the next four people in 
the list will be in a group together, and so on, with the four people at the end of the list in 
a group as well.   Each member of a group will be told what levels of return the other 
people in their group chose.   The actual return to the private account in each group will 
be the average level chosen by the four people in the group (rounded to the nearest .05 
E$s).  You will be told this amount.  The return to the group account in all groups will 
be 0.40 E$s for each token placed in the group account. 
 
For Example:  If the choices of the sixteen people in the experiment were: 
[.55,   .60,   .60,   .65,   .65,   .70,   .70,   .75,  .75,   .80,   .80,   .85,   .85,   .90,   .90, and 
.95] 
 
The four highest choices would be a group [.95, .90, .90, and .85] with a return to the 
private account for each member of that group of 0.90 E$s for every token an individual 
placed in their own private account (and a return of  0.40 E$s for each token placed in 
the group account.)  
 
The four lowest choices would be a group [.65, .60, .60, and .55] with a return to the 
private account for each member of that group of 0.60 E$s for every dollar an individual 
placed in their own private account (and a return of  0.40 E$s for each token placed in 
the group account.) 
 
The second four highest choices would be a group [.85, .80, .80, and .75] with a return to 
the private account for each member of that group of 0.80 E$s for every token an 
individual placed in their own private account (and a return of  0.40 E$s for each token 
placed in the group account.) 
 
The second four lowest choices would be a group [.75, .70, .70, and .65] with a return to 
the private account for each member of that group of 0.70 E$s for every dollar an 
individual placed in their own private account (and a return of  0.40 E$s for each token 
placed in the group account.) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Quiz: You will be paid $0.25 for each complete correct answer of the following three 
questions: 
If you are in a group where the chosen levels are [.55, .70, .70, and .85] (an average of 
0.70):  
1)  What is the return to the group account (per token) for each member of your 
group?____ 
2)  What is the return to the private account (per token) for each member of your 
group?____ 
3)  What would you receive from your private account if you placed:  
  1 token in the private account____        10 tokens in the private account_____ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
You will now be matched with a new group in the same manner as before.  Circle below 
how many E$s per token you would like the private account to return for the group you 
are placed in.  You will be placed in a group with others who chose a similar amount to 
you with matching occurring in the same manner as it did before.  
 
Circle your preferred return level below: 
 
.55      .60      .65      .70      .75      .80      .85      .90     .95 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Your group is made of four people who chose  
       ↑ was your choice 
 
The private account pays        for every token you place in your private 
account  
 
The group account pays you 0.4E$s for every token placed in the group account by you 
or the other group members you are randomly assigned to this round.  
 
You will play this game with this matching only once. 
    
 
